Abstract. We revisit a key agreement scheme presented by Leighton and Micali [11], generalize the scheme, and present a new framework of tree-based key distribution pattern (TKDP). We presents a method of constructing TKDPs from cover-free families. We show the existence of TKDPs by probabilistic method. We can reduce the upper bounds on the minimum number of rows of (t, w, T )-TKDPs, which are obtained from probabilistic methods, asymptotically by a factor of w as compared to Leighton and Micali's schemes by choosing optimal trees T instead of chains.
Introduction
In our model, the network consists of a trusted authority (TA) and a set of users U = {U 1 , . . . , U n }. Let 2 U denote the collection of all subsets of users. P ⊆ 2 U and F ⊆ 2 U will denote the collection of privileged subsets and the collection of forbidden subsets, respectively. Γ = (P, F ) is called an access structure. Roughly speaking, a key predistribution scheme (KPS) with an access structure Γ is a method for the TA to distribute secret shares to each user in the network, so that any user in a privileged subset P can easily compute their group key K P , while any coalition F ∈ F disjoint from P can compute K P only with negligible probability. In this paper, we will consider an access structure Γ (t,w) = (P, F ) such that P = {P ⊆ U : |P | = t} and F = {F ⊆ U : |F | = w}. Thus any t users can compute a common key while any coalition of at most w users can obtain no information on the key. (Such KPSs are called (t, w)-KPSs.) One method of constructing KPSs uses key distribution patterns (KDPs), due to Mitchell and Piper [13] . We will extend the study of KDPs by allowing hashed shares of information in the generation of secret keys. We can easily derive a condition that a coalition of w users, U j 1 , . . . , U j w obtain a hashed key between innocent users U j1 and U j2 as follows: min(α i,j 1 , . . . , α i,j w ) ≤ max(α i,j1 , α i,j2 ), for all i = 1, . . . , b. The authors of [11] computed the probability that a set of randomly chosen sequences protects pairwise keys against adversarial coalitions of size at most w. They claim that the probability becomes large enough when w is about (b/e ln n) 1 
Extension of Leighton and Micali Scheme
We extend Leighton and Micali's scheme in three directions. Linear Ordering to Tree Ordering. Suppose that a matrix M = (α i,j ) of public sequences is determined. For each row of the matrix, a "seed" secret
Pairwise
(a) Linear ordering share is generated and each entry represents the hash depth applied to the seed. Therefore, we observe a hierarchy or an ordering between entries (symbols) in the sense that one information is enough to compute the other, but not conversely. For two symbols α 1 and α 2 , we define α 1 ≤ α 2 if the information(= h α2 (s)) associated with α 2 is easily computed from the information(= h α1 (s)) associated with α 1 . We can represent the ordering of symbols for each row as a chain structure ( Fig. 1(a) ), which coincides with the natural linear ordering of integers.
However we can also define nonlinear orderings based on rooted trees. For example, Fig. 1(b) shows an ordering of symbols based on a balanced binary tree of depth 2. Seven hashed shares are derived from a seed for each row, using (public) symbols of the tree in the hash computation. (The symbols are interpreted as binary sequences of a fixed length in the computation.) Probabilistic Construction to Deterministic Construction. We can construct a matrix M of public sequences in a deterministic way, instead of choosing random columns. For example, cover-free families, orthogonal arrays or ordered designs could be used. We also introduce a symbol ∞ as an entry of M , which means "no information". Based on a chain ordering, we can replace the largest symbol L − 1 by ∞; since the corresponding hashed share h (L−1) (s) (for some seed s) can be computed by any other single user, it makes no contribution to secure communication. Therefore we would rather assign no information to the symbol in order to save memory storage per user.
Other Related Works
Blom [3] presented key predistribution schemes that require each user store w +1 keys to protect each pairwise key against any coalition attack of at most w users. Blundo et al. [4] generalized Blom's scheme to allow for any group of size t to establish its group key. For a group key to be secure against a coalition of w users, each user has to store t+w−1 t−1 keys. They also proved the key storage is information theoretically optimal. Mitchell and Piper [13] presented KPSs using key predistribution patterns, which involve very little arithmetic computation. The KDPs are equivalent to cover-free families, which are widely studied and generalized (for example, [17] and [18] ). Such unconditionally secure key predistribution schemes are studied as special families of linear key predistribution schemes [14] . The efficiency of KPSs can be improved by choosing orthogonal arrays or perpendicular arrays as KDPs and then using resilient functions in the generation of keys [16] . Recently, Attrapadung et al. [2] studied key predistribution schemes using key chains from pseudo-random sequence generators (PRSGs). In a network of n users, each user stores O 2 n−1 n keys to establish group keys of any size, which are secure against any coalition attacks, based on the security of the PRSGs.
Since Eschenauer and Gligor's work [8] , a series of papers on (pairwise) key predistribution for distributed sensor networks have been published ( [5] , [9] , [10] , [12] , [15] ). The main difference of these KPSs from conventional ones is that they allow certain pairs of nodes to share no common key. The attack model and the metric to evaluate the resiliency are also different, which are based on probabilistic analysis.
Our Contributions
By extending Leighton and Micali's scheme, we present a new framework of tree-based key distribution patterns (TKDPs). In section 3, we present a simple method of constructing TKDPs from cover-free families. In section 4, we show the existence of TKDPs by probabilistic methods, similar to [7] . Especially, the upper bounds on the minimum number of rows of (t, w, T )-TKDPs, which are obtained from probabilistic methods, are asymptotically w times smaller than Leighton and Micali's schemes (with the same parameters), when we choose optimal trees T instead of chains. One advantage of TKDP-based KPSs over Leighton and Micali's schemes is smaller hash depths are applied to each secret seed, which means less computation is required.
Tree-Based Key Distribution Pattern
We are now prepared to present a framework of a tree-based key distribution pattern (TKDP). First, we define a rooted tree T on L vertices, labeled from 0 to L − 1. Especially, the root vertex is labeled by 0. As we observed in the previous section, a rooted tree defines a partial ordering on L vertices. We say j 1 < j 2 if a vertex j 1 is an ancestor of j 2 . For example, we observe that 0 < 3 and 2 < 5 in Fig. 1(b) . But there is no relation between 1 and 2. We also define j < ∞ for every j ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1}. From now on, we will identify the set of users with the integers from 1 to n. Definition 2.1. Let T be a rooted tree labeled by {0, . . . , L − 1} and let Γ = (P, F ) be an access structure. Let M = (α i,j ) be a b × n matrix with
KPS from TKDP. We construct a KPS with an access structure Γ from a TKDP in the following manner:
and a tree T on a set {0, . . . , L − 1} of vertices.
of length l 1 and computes hashed shares s(i, j) recursively based on the tree
, where the label of each vertex is represented as a binary sequence of length l 2 .
User j receives secret shares s(i, α
The key K P for a privileged set P is defined to be
For a given i ∈ I P ,j is not necessarily unique, but α i,j is.
Any user j ∈ P can compute every term in K P by using the function h, while a disjoint coalition F ∈ F cannot compute at least one term
,j for all j ∈ F (by Def. 2.1). In this case, we say row i * (P,F ) protects P against F . If l 1 is the bit length of a secure key for a symmetric encryption, then we can say the KPS is secure with respect to the access structure Γ .
Remark 2.1. We assume a random oracle model for the function h in the sense that we cannot obtain the value of h(s) without query to the random oracle. 
is a (2, 2, T 7 )-TKDP(7, 7), where T 7 is a tree of depth 1 with 7 leaves (Fig. 2 ). The TA generates random secret seeds s i for i = 1, . . . , 7. Two users U 1 and U 2 (corresponding to the first two columns) receive sets of keys
and
respectively. For P = {1, 2}, we have I P = {1, 2, 3, 5, 6}. Both U 1 and U 2 can compute the group key
An adversarial coalition of two users, say, U 3 and U 4 , cannot compute h(s 5 2) and h(s 6 1). In fact, K 1,2 is secure against any coalition of size 2.
Cover-Free Families and TKDPs
In this section, we will show some relations between cover-free families (or equivalently, conventional key distribution patterns) and TKDPs. A set system is a pair (X, A), where A is a finite set of subsets of X, called blocks. 
Then M C is the incidence matrix of a (t, w)-CFF(b, n). The converse is proved in a similar way.
There is a method of constructing TKDPs based on rooted trees of depth 1 from CFFs. (From now on, rooted trees of depth 1 are called star-like trees.) Let T n be a star-like tree with root 0 and n leaves (labeled from 1 to n).
Theorem 3.1. If there exists a (t−1, w)-CFF(b, n), then there exists a (t, w, T n )-TKDP(b, n).
Proof. Let M C = (β i,j ) be the incidence matrix of a (t − 1, w)-CFF(b, n). Then we can define a b × n matrix M T = (α i,j ) as follows;
The columns of M C and M T are indexed from 1 to n; the rows of M C and M T are indexed from 1 to b. Let P = {j 1 , . . . , j t } and F = {j 1 , . . . , j w } be disjoint subsets of columns. Since M C is the incidence matrix of a (t − 1, w)-CFF(b, n), there exists a row i such that β i,j1 = . . . = β i,jt−1 = 1, and β i,j 1 = . . . = β i,j w = 0. Since α i,j1 = . . . = α i,jt−1 = 0, we have α i,j ≤ α i,jt for every j ∈ P . On the other hand, we have α i,j α i,jt for every j ∈ F since the symbols α i,j represent distinct leaves of the tree. (In the context of KPS, the group key of P contains a hashed share h(s i j t ) as a summand, while the coalition of F cannot compute it.) Example 3.1. Let t = w = 2 and b = n = 7. Then we can construct a (2, 2, T 7 )-TKDP(7, 7), say M T , from the incidence matrix M C of a (1, 2)-CFF (7, 7) , where 
Probabilistic Method to Construct TKDPs
We will show the existence of a (t, w, T )-TKDP(b, n), denoted M = (α i,j ), by using the probabilistic method [1] . We would like for the matrix M to have as few rows as possible.
Now we fix a tree T on a set
. . , L−1, ∞} n be the set of all possible rows of length n with symbols from {0, . . . , L − 1, ∞}. We define a probability distribution P on the set S, and a random variable X(P, F ) on S for any disjoint pair of P ∈ P and F ∈ F as follows:
Let M b×n be the set of all b × n matrices with symbols from {0, . . . , L − 1, ∞}. By the probability distribution P, we pick uniformly at random b rows to construct a matrix in M b×n . The distribution P and the random variable X(P, F ) naturally define the inherited probability distribution P b and random variable X b (P, F ) = 0 if there exists a row that protects P against F 1 otherwise.
on M b×n . Then we have
Finally, we define a random variable 
Pr[X(P, F ) = 0].
Then it is easy to see that
A simple computation shows
where
for sufficiently smallp t,w . Note thatp t,w is determined by the probability distribution P on S and the tree T .
Example 4.1. Let T be a chain on n vertices. Suppose we define
In the following sections, we consider two kinds of probability distributions to generate random rows.
Independent Random Selection of Symbols
In this section, we fix a tree T on V = {0, . . . , L − 1}, and find the optimal probability distribution such that each symbol is chosen independently; each symbol i ∈ V ∪ {∞} is selected with probability p i , where 0 ≤ p i ≤ 1 for i = 0, . . . , L − 1, ∞, and
Then the probability distribution P on S = {0, . . . , L − 1, ∞} n is derived as follows:
where wt i (α) is the number of i's appearing in α. Now we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Let P(v) denote the path from the root 0 to v ∈ V in T and let prt(v) denote the parent of v. Then we have
for any disjoint P ∈ P and F ∈ F.
Proof. Note that Pr[X(P, F ) = 0] is the probability that a row(sequence) protects P against F when it is chosen by the probability distribution P. Suppose that we pick up a sequence α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ). If α protects P against F , then there exists j * ∈ P such that α j ≤ α j * , for all j ∈ P and α j α j * , for all j ∈ F . Since the symbol α j * is unique, we can define max(α, P ) = α j * for any sequence α that protects P against F .
If max(α, P ) = v, then the positions of P should consist of symbols of the path from the root to the vertex v, and contain at least one symbol of v. On the other hand, the positions of F should contain no symbol from the path. Therefore we have
for every v ∈ V . Now the lemma is true since
By using the above lemma, we can find optimal probability distributions for some special cases. L = 2. We have a unique tree T on 2 vertices. We would like to maximize the probability to construct a (t, w, T )-TKDP(b, n), denoted M = (α i,j ). In this model, symbols 0, 1 and ∞ are selected in a independent random way with probabilities p 0 , p 1 and p ∞ , respectively. By Lemma 4.1, we havē
Removing p ∞ , we have to solve the following problem to find an optimal probability distribution: By the condition (1), there exists a (2, 1, T )-TKDP(91, 1000). On the other hand, if we use a probabilistic method [7] for cover-free families, we can show the existence of a (2, 1)-CFF(130,1000) at best. Therefore we have about 40% improvement in the number of rows.
Star-Like Trees with Many Leaves.
Suppose T is a star-like tree with a leaves (labeled from 1 to a). We choose each leaf with the same probability p 1 , and set p ∞ = 0 and t = 2, for simple analysis. Then we have to solve the following problem:
Put x = p 0 and y = ap 1 . For a sufficiently large a, we have the approximation
we see thatp 2,w attains its (approximate) maximum 
Random Permutations
In this section, we fix a probabilistic distribution, and find the optimal tree ordering. We extend Example 4.1 to a (general) tree T on a set V = {0, . . . , L−1} of vertices such that L + 1 ≥ n. We define a probability distribution P on S = {0, . . . , L − 1, ∞} n as follows:
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. Let m d be the number of vertices whose distance from the root is d. Then we have
Example 4.3. Let t = 2, w = 1, and let T be a binary tree on L = 7 vertices as seen in Fig. 1(b) . Since m 0 = 1, m 1 = 2 and m 2 = 4, we have
by Lemma 4.2. Therefore, when we choose a sequence from S = {0, . . . , 6, ∞} n by the probability distribution P (for any n ≤ 8), the sequence protects any two users against another single user with the probability ≈ 0.369.
Proof. Note that Pr[X(P, F ) = 0] is the probability that a row(sequence) protects P against F when it is chosen by the probability distribution P. Suppose that we choose a sequence α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ). If α protects P against F , then there exists j * ∈ P such that α j ≤ α j * , for all j ∈ P and α j α j * , for all j ∈ F .
Since the symbol α j * is unique, we can define max(α, P ) = α j * for any sequence α that protects P against F . If max(α, P ) = v, then the positions of P should consist of symbols of the path from the root to the vertex v, and contain exactly one symbol of v. On the other hand, the positions of F should contain no symbol from the path. Therefore we have 
Conclusion
We presented a new framework of tree-based key distribution pattern (TKDP). We constructed TKDPs from cover-free families. We note that other combinatorial structures such as orthogonal arrays, ordered designs and covering arrays also yield TKDPs. (This will be addressed in later work.) We showed the existence of TKDPs by the probabilistic method. Furthermore, we reduced the upper bounds on the minimum number of rows of (t, w, T )-TKDPs, which are obtained from probabilistic methods, asymptotically by a factor of w as compared to Leighton and Micali's schemes by choosing optimal trees T instead of chains. The TKDP-based schemes are expected to have applications to sensor networks since they involve only hash computations in the establishment of pairwise keys, which are known to be more energy-efficient than RSA or elliptic curve operations.
